Certified-based control unit-key fob pairing

• US 9,654,968 B2
• Filed: 07/15/2013
• Issued: 05/16/2017
• Est. Priority Date: 07/17/2012
• Status: Active Grant

• Current Assignee: Texas Instruments, Inc.
• Original Assignee: Texas Instruments, Inc.
• Inventors: Peeters, Eric, Ho, Jin-Meng
• Primary Examiner(s): ZAIDI, SYED A
• Application Number:
  US13/942,367
• Publication Number:
  US 20140025950A1
• Time in Patent Office: 1,401 Days
• Field of Search: 713168
• CPC Class Codes: B60K 2360/23 using reflectors
• CPC Class Codes: B60K 2360/25 using filters
• CPC Class Codes: B60K 2360/27 using semi-transparent optical elements
• CPC Class Codes: B60K 2360/31 Virtual images
• CPC Class Codes: B60K 2360/334 Projection means
• CPC Class Codes: B60K 2360/349 Adjustment of brightness
• CPC Class Codes: B60K 2360/77 Instrument locations other than the dashboard
• CPC Class Codes: B60K 35/00 Instruments specially adapted for vehicles; Arrangement of instruments in or on vehicles
• CPC Class Codes: B60K 35/213 Virtual instruments
• CPC Class Codes: B60K 35/23 Head-up displays [HUD] optical aspects of head-up displays G02B27/01
• CPC Class Codes: B60K 35/60 Instruments characterised by their location or relative disposition in or on vehicles arrangements of lighting devices on dashboards B60Q3/10
• CPC Class Codes: B60R 2325/108 Encryption
• CPC Class Codes: B60R 25/24 using electronic identifiers containing a code not memorised by the user
• CPC Class Codes: G02B 2027/0118 comprising devices for improving the contrast of the display / brillance control visibility
• CPC Class Codes: G02B 26/0833 the reflecting element being a micromechanical device, e.g. a MEMS mirror, DMD G02B26/0825 takes precedence; micromechanical devices in general B81B
• CPC Class Codes: G02B 27/01 Head-up displays
• CPC Class Codes: G02B 27/0101 characterised by optical features G02B27/0172 takes precedence
• CPC Class Codes: G02B 5/30 Polarising elements light-modulating devices with active elements G02F1/00
• CPC Class Codes: G06K 7/10227 loading programming parameters or programs into the interrogator, e.g. for configuring the interrogator
• CPC Class Codes: G07C 2009/00769 with data transmission performed by wireless means
• CPC Class Codes: G07C 9/00309 : operated with bidirectional data transmission between data carrier and locks
• CPC Class Codes: H01S 5/4012 : Beam combining, e.g. by the use of fibres, gratings, polarisers, prisms
• CPC Class Codes: H01S 5/4093 : Red, green and blue [RGB] generated directly by laser action or by a combination of laser action with nonlinear frequency conversion
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 2209/24 : Key scheduling, i.e. generating round keys or sub-keys for block encryption
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 2209/80 : Wireless network architectures or network communication protocols for wireless network security H04W12/00
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 2209/805 : Lightweight hardware, e.g. radio-frequency identification [RFID] or sensor
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 2209/84 : Vehicles
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/0428 : wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/061 : for key exchange, e.g. in peer-to-peer networks cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for key agreement H04L9/0838
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/0822 : using key encryption key
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/0838 : Key agreement, i.e. key establishment technique in which a shared key is derived by parties as a function of information contributed by, or associated with, each of these network architectures or network communication protocols for key exchange in a packet data network H04L63/061
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/0844 : with user authentication or key authentication, e.g. ElGamal, MTI, MQV-Menezes-Qu-Vanstone protocol or Diffie-Hellman protocols using implicitly-certified keys
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/0861 : Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/0897 : involving additional devices, e.g. trusted platform module [TPM], smartcard or USB
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/14 : using a plurality of keys or algorithms
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/3013 : involving the discrete logarithm problem, e.g. ElGamal or Diffie-Hellman systems
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/3066 : involving algebraic varieties, e.g. elliptic or hyper-elliptic curves
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/3263 : involving certificates, e.g. public key certificate [PKC] or attribute certificate [AC]; Public key infrastructure [PKI] arrangements network architectures or network communication protocols for supporting authentication of entities using certificates in a packet data network H04L63/0823
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/3268 : using certificate validation, registration, distribution or revocation, e.g. certificate revocation list [CRL]
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/3271 : using challenge-response
• CPC Class Codes: H04N 9/3129 : scanning a light beam on the display screen scanning a light beam on a screen in displays other than projection devices G09G3/02; scanning systems in general G02B26/10; projectors using laser light sources in general H04N9/3161
• CPC Class Codes: H04N 9/3155 : for controlling the light source light source control per se H05B35/00 – H05B47/00; control of an illumination source for displays in general G09G3/3406
• CPC Class Codes: H04N 9/3167 : for polarizing the light beam polarizing optical systems per se G02B27/28
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 12/04 : Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA]
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 12/50 : Secure pairing of devices
• CPC Class Codes: H05B 47/11 : by determining the brightness or colour temperature of ambient light
• CPC Class Codes: H05B 47/14 : by determining electrical parameters of the light source
• CPC Class Codes: Y02B 20/40 : Control techniques providing energy savings, e.g. smart controller or presence detection

Abstract

A key fob-control unit pairing device that includes a transceiver to transmit and receive signals, a memory to store a certificate of authenticity (CertVD) associated with the pairing device and a public key (PKVM), and a processor coupled to said transceiver and memory. The processor is to receive a public key (PKKF) from a key fob and associated with the key fob and a certificate of authenticity (CertKF) associated with the key fob, verify the CertKF with the PKVM, and transmit an encrypted PKKF to a control unit.

Claims

1. A pairing device, comprising:

a transceiver that transmits and receives signals;

a memory that stores a first certificate of authenticity associated with the pairing device and a first public key; and

a processor coupled to the transceiver and the memory, wherein the processor executes instructions stored in the memory to;

receive a second public key and a second certificate of authenticity, the second public key and the second certificate of authenticity each being associated with a key fob device;

verify the second certificate of authenticity using the first public key;

execute a key agreement protocol to generate a secret encryption key that is shared between the pairing device and a control unit;

encrypt the second public key using the secret encryption key; and

transmit the encrypted second public key to the control unit.

2. The pairing device of claim 1, wherein the processor verifies the second certificate of authenticity by determining whether or not the second certificate of authenticity is on a certificate revocation list.

3. The pairing device of claim 1, wherein the processor executes instructions to transmit, via the transceiver, the first certificate of authenticity to the control unit for verification before executing the key agreement protocol.

4. The pairing device of claim 1, wherein the key agreement protocol is based on elliptical curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) encryption.

5. The pairing device of claim 1, wherein the key agreement protocol is based on elliptical curve cryptography (ECC).

6. The pairing device of claim 1, wherein the first public key is associated with a certificate authority.

7. The pairing device of claim 6, wherein the certificate authority is a vehicle manufacturer and the control unit is installed in a vehicle.

8. The pairing device of claim 6, wherein the first certificate of authenticity is generated by signing a third public key using a private key associated with the certificate authority.

9. The pairing device of claim 6, wherein the certificate authority and the control unit are separate.

10. The pairing device of claim 1, wherein the second certificate of authenticity is verified using the first public key by hashing the second certificate of authenticity with the first public key.

11. A first device, comprising:

a transceiver that transmits and receives signals;

a memory that stores a first certificate of authenticity associated with the first device and a first public key; and

a processor coupled to the transceiver and the memory, the processor executing instructions stored in the memory to;

receive, using the transceiver, a second public key and a second certificate of authenticity, the second public key and the second certificate of authenticity each being associated with a second device, wherein the second public key is received separately from the second certificate of authenticity;

verify the second certificate of authenticity using the first public key;

execute a key agreement protocol to generate a secret encryption key that is shared between the first device and a third device;

encrypt the second public key using the secret encryption key; and

transmit, using the transceiver, the encrypted second public key to the third device;

wherein the first, second, and third devices are separate from each other.

12. The first device of claim 11, wherein the processor verifies the second certificate of authenticity by determining whether or not the second certificate of authenticity is on a certificate revocation list.

13. The first device of claim 11, wherein the processor executes instructions to transmit, using the transceiver, the first certificate of authenticity to the third device for verification before executing the key agreement protocol.

14. The first device of claim 11, wherein the key agreement protocol is based on a Diffie-Hellman encryption.

15. The first device of claim 11, wherein the first public key is associated with a certificate authority that is separate from the first, second, and third devices.

16. The first device of claim 15, wherein the first certificate of authenticity is generated by signing a third public key using a private key associated with the certificate authority.

17. The first device of claim 11, wherein the transceiver includes a wired transceiver and a wireless transceiver.

18. The first device of claim 17, wherein using the transceiver to receive the second public key and the second certificate of authenticity comprises using the wireless transceiver.

19. The first device of claim 17, wherein using the transceiver to transmit the encrypted second public key comprises using the wired transceiver.

20. The first device of claim 17, wherein:

the wireless transceiver receives the second public key and the second certificate of authenticity; and

the wired transceiver transmits the encrypted second public key.