Analyzing navigation data to detect navigation data spoofing

• US 9,725,171 B1
• Filed: 09/25/2015
• Issued: 08/08/2017
• Est. Priority Date: 09/25/2015
• Status: Active Grant

• Current Assignee: Amazon Technologies, Inc. (Amazon.com, Inc.)
• Original Assignee: Amazon Technologies, Inc. (Amazon.com, Inc.)
• Inventors: Carmack, Scott Gerard, Lakkakula, Narasimha Rao, Sharifi Mehr, Nima
• Primary Examiner(s): Frejd, Russell
• Application Number:
  US14/866,743
• Time in Patent Office: 683 Days
• CPC Class Codes: B64C 39/024 of the remote controlled vehicle type, i.e. RPV
• CPC Class Codes: B64U 10/13 Flying platforms
• CPC Class Codes: B64U 2101/30 for imaging, photography or videography
• CPC Class Codes: B64U 2101/60 for transporting passengers; for transporting goods other than weapons
• CPC Class Codes: B64U 2101/64 for parcel delivery or retrieval
• CPC Class Codes: B64U 2201/104 using satellite radio beacon positioning systems, e.g. GPS
• CPC Class Codes: G01S 19/215 issues related to spoofing
• CPC Class Codes: G05D 1/102 specially adapted for vertical take-off of aircraft
• CPC Class Codes: G05D 3/00 Control of position or direction G05D1/00 takes precedence; numerical control to execute positioning G05B19/18

Abstract

Techniques for determining whether data associated with an autonomous operation of an unmanned vehicle may be trusted. For example, the data may be analyzed in light of a capability of the unmanned vehicle. The analysis may indicate an operation of the unmanned vehicle. If the operation is unsupported by the capability, the data may be determined to be untrusted. Accordingly, the autonomous navigation may be directed independently of the untrusted data.

Claims

1. A computer-implemented method, comprising:

receiving, by a computer system of an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), global positioning system (GPS) data, the computer system configured to direct a flight of the UAV to deliver an item from a source to a destination based at least in part on the GPS data;

generating, by the computer system, a state associated with the flight, the state comprising a flight parameter determined over time based at least in part on the GPS data;

determining, by the computer system, that the state indicates a change to the flight parameter;

determining, by the computer system, that the flight parameter corresponds to a capability of the UAV and that the change to the flight parameter corresponds to an operation of the UAV unsupported by the capability of the UAV, the capability of the UAV supporting a range for the flight parameter;

determining, by the computer system, that the GPS data is spoofed based at least in part on the operation; and

directing, by the computer system, a portion of the flight independently of the GPS data that is spoofed.

2. The computer-implemented method of claim 1, wherein the flight parameter comprises at least one of:

a speed, an acceleration, an altitude, a yaw, a roll, or a pitch of the UAV.

3. The computer-implemented method of claim 2, wherein determining that the GPS data is spoofed comprises:

determining, by the computer system, a discrepancy between the flight parameter and the range supported by the capability of the UAV; and

determining, by the computer system, that the discrepancy exceeds a threshold, wherein the threshold is based at least in part on one or more of;

the capability of the UAV, historical deliveries of the UAV, historical deliveries of another UAV, or a value of the item.

4. The computer-implemented method of claim 1, wherein directing the portion of the flight independently of the GPS data comprises:

receiving sensor data of a navigation sensor of the UAV; and

directing the portion of the flight based at least in part on the sensor data.

5. The computer-implemented method of claim 1, wherein the change to the flight parameter is determined from the state at an analysis frequency, wherein the analysis frequency is based at least in part on one or more of:

a power level of the UAV or the item carried by the UAV for delivery.

6. One or more non-transitory computer readable media comprising instructions that, when executed with a computer system, cause the computer system to at least:

access navigation data of a source external to an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), the navigation data associated with directing an autonomous navigation of the UAV;

determine a flight parameter based at least in part on the navigation data, the flight parameter corresponding to a capability of the UAV, the capability supporting a range for the flight parameter;

monitor a change to the flight parameter to determine whether the change indicates an operation that is associated with the autonomous navigation and that is unsupported by the capability of the UAV;

determine that the navigation data is untrusted based at least in part on the change to the flight parameter indicating the operation; and

direct the autonomous navigation of the UAV independently of the navigation data based at least in part on the navigation data being untrusted.

7. The one or more non-transitory computer readable media of claim 6, wherein the UAV is configured to deliver an item available from an electronic marketplace, wherein the source external to the UAV comprises a global positioning system (GPS), and wherein the navigation data comprises GPS data.

8. The one or more non-transitory computer readable media of claim 6, wherein monitoring the change comprises:

generating a navigation state representative of the autonomous navigation over time based at least in part on the navigation data, the navigation state comprising the flight parameter; and

identifying the operation based at least in part on the change over time to the flight parameter from the navigation state.

9. The one or more non-transitory computer readable media of claim 6, wherein the autonomous navigation comprises a pre-determined navigation route, wherein the change is monitored based at least in part on checkpoints along the pre-determined route.

10. The one or more non-transitory computer readable media of claim 6, wherein determining the flight parameter comprises determining a navigation speed of the UAV, wherein the operation is determined based at least in part on the navigation speed exceeding a range of navigation speeds supported by the UAV.

11. The one or more non-transitory computer readable media of claim 10, wherein the navigation speed exceeds an upper bound of the range of the navigation speeds by a threshold, wherein the threshold is based at least in part on one or more of:

historical data associated with the autonomous navigation of the UAV or historical data associated with autonomous navigations of other UAVs.

12. The one or more non-transitory computer readable media of claim 11, wherein the threshold is adjusted based at least in part on the navigation data being untrusted.

13. A system associated with an unmanned vehicle, the system comprising:

one or more processors; and

one or more non-transitory computer readable media comprising instructions that, when executed with the one or more processors, cause the system to at least;

access navigation data of a source external to the unmanned vehicle, the navigation data associated with directing an autonomous navigation of the unmanned vehicle;

determine a navigation parameter based at least in part on the navigation data, the navigation parameter corresponding to a capability of the unmanned vehicle, the capability supporting a range for the navigation parameter;

determine that a change to the navigation parameter indicates an operation associated with the autonomous navigation and unsupported by the capability of the unmanned vehicle;

determine that the navigation data is untrusted based at least in part on the change to the navigation parameter indicating the operation; and

generate a corrective action associated with directing the autonomous navigation of the unmanned vehicle independently of the navigation data that is untrusted.

14. The system of claim 13, wherein the system is installed at the unmanned vehicle.

15. The system of claim 13, wherein the corrective action comprises:

requesting sensor data from navigation sensors of the unmanned vehicle;

confirming that the navigation data is untrusted based at least in part on the sensor data; and

directing the autonomous navigation of the unmanned vehicle based at least in part on the sensor data.

16. The system of claim 13, wherein the corrective action comprises:

requesting image data of a location of the unmanned vehicle from an imaging sensor of the unmanned vehicle; and

confirming that the navigation data is untrusted based at least in part on the image data.

17. The system of claim 13, wherein the corrective action comprises:

reporting that the navigation data is untrusted to a central station; and

facilitating remote navigation of the unmanned vehicle from the central station.

18. The system of claim 13, wherein the corrective action comprises:

causing the unmanned vehicle to park; and

reporting that the unmanned vehicle is parked to a central station.

19. The system of claim 13, wherein the corrective action comprises confirming that the navigation data is untrusted based at least in part on maintaining a location of the unmanned vehicle and detecting that the navigation data changes over time while the location is maintained.

20. The system of claim 13, wherein the corrective action comprises confirming that the navigation data is untrusted based at least in part on a report of navigation data spoofing received from another unmanned vehicle.