Methods for secure restoration of personal identity credentials into electronic devices

• US 9,979,709 B2
• Filed: 09/09/2015
• Issued: 05/22/2018
• Est. Priority Date: 08/06/2002
• Status: Active Grant

• Current Assignee: Apple Inc.
• Original Assignee: Apple Inc.
• Inventors: Abdallah, David S., Johnson, Barry W.
• Primary Examiner(s): Gergiso, Techane
• Application Number:
  US14/849,473
• Publication Number:
  US 20160065373A1
• Time in Patent Office: 986 Days
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 21/32 using biometric data, e.g. fingerprints, iris scans or voiceprints
• CPC Class Codes: G06Q 20/40145 Biometric identity checks
• CPC Class Codes: G06V 40/10 Human or animal bodies, e.g. vehicle occupants or pedestrians; Body parts, e.g. hands
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/06 for supporting key management in a packet data network cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for key management H04L9/08
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/0861 using biometrical features, e.g. fingerprint, retina-scan cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for entity authentication using biological data H04L9/3231
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/0894 Escrow, recovery or storing of secret information, e.g. secret key escrow or cryptographic key storage
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/30 Public key, i.e. encryption algorithm being computationally infeasible to invert or user's encryption keys not requiring secrecy
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/3231 Biological data, e.g. fingerprint, voice or retina network architectures or network communication protocols for supporting authentication of entities using biometrical features in a packet data network H04L63/0861
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/3247 involving digital signatures
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/3263 involving certificates, e.g. public key certificate [PKC] or attribute certificate [AC]; Public key infrastructure [PKI] arrangements network architectures or network communication protocols for supporting authentication of entities using certificates in a packet data network H04L63/0823

Abstract

A method and system for securely enrolling personal identity credentials into personal identification devices. The system of the invention comprises the manufacturer of the device and an enrollment authority. The manufacturer is responsible for recording serial numbers or another unique identifier for each device that it produces, along with a self-generated public key for each device. The enrollment authority is recognized by the manufacturer or another suitable institution as capable of validating an individual before enrolling him into the device. The enrollment authority maintains and operates the appropriate equipment for enrollment, and provides its approval of the enrollment. The methods described herein discuss post-manufacturing, enrollment, backup, and recovery processes for the device.

Claims

1. A computer-implemented method, comprising:

receiving, by a personal identification device, a signature associated with a biometric encryption key from a party, the signature having been decrypted by the party based on a private key associated with the party, wherein the biometric encryption key was previously split into a first section and a second section, the first section and second sections each encrypted using a different key;

verifying, by the personal identification device, a validity of the signature based on a public key associated with a first personal identification device;

decrypting, by the personal identification device, the encrypted first and second sections of the biometric encryption key; and

combining, by the personal identification device, the decrypted first section of the biometric encryption key and the decrypted second section of the biometric encryption key to restore the biometric encryption key when the validity of the signature is verified.

2. The computer-implemented method of claim 1, wherein the second section of the biometric encryption key was decrypted by the party using the private key associated with the party.

3. The computer-implemented method of claim 1, wherein the first section of the biometric encryption key was decrypted using a passcode entered by a user.

4. The computer-implemented method of claim 3, wherein the passcode was entered by the user on a second personal identification device.

5. The computer-implemented method of claim 1, further comprising:

decrypting, by a second personal identification device, biometric data associated with the first personal identification device.

6. The computer-implemented method of claim 5, further comprising:

receiving the biometric data associated with the first personal identification device from one of;

the party, an electronic storage repository, or a persistent storage medium.

7. The computer-implemented method of claim 5, further comprising:

storing the biometric data associated with the first personal identification device in the second personal identification device.

8. The method of claim 1, wherein the personal identification is one of the first personal identification device, or a second personal identification device.

9. A non-transitory computer-readable medium programmed with executable instructions that, when executed by a processing system comprising at least one hardware processor, perform operations comprising:

receiving, by a personal identification device, a signature associated with a biometric encryption key from a party, the signature having been decrypted by the party based on a private key associated with the party, wherein the biometric encryption key was previously split into a first section and a second section, the first section and second sections each encrypted using a different key;

verifying, by the personal identification device, a validity of the signature based on a public key associated with a first personal identification device;

decrypting, by the personal identification device, the encrypted first and second sections of the biometric encryption key; and

combining, by the personal identification device, the decrypted first section of the biometric encryption key and the decrypted second section of the biometric encryption key to restore the biometric encryption key when the validity of the signature is verified.

10. The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 9, wherein the second section of the biometric encryption key was decrypted by the party using the private key associated with the party.

11. The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 9, wherein the first section of the biometric encryption key was decrypted using a passcode entered by a user.

12. The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 11, wherein the passcode was entered by the user on a second personal identification device.

13. The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 9, the operations further comprising:

decrypting, by a second personal identification device, biometric data associated with the first personal identification device.

14. The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 13, the operations further comprising:

receiving the biometric data associated with the first personal identification device from one of;

the party, an electronic storage repository, or a persistent storage medium.

15. The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 13, the operations further comprising:

storing the biometric data associated with the first personal identification device in the second personal identification device.

16. A system comprising a personal identification device having a memory coupled to at least one hardware processor, the memory comprising processor-executable instructions that, when executed by the at least one hardware processor, perform operations comprising:

receiving, by the personal identification device, a signature associated with a biometric encryption key from a party, the signature having been decrypted by the party based on a private key associated with the party, wherein the biometric encryption key was previously split into a first section and a second section, the first section and second sections each encrypted using a different key;

verifying, by the personal identification device, a validity of the signature based on a public key associated with a first personal identification device;

decrypting, by the personal identification device, the encrypted first and second sections of the biometric encryption key; and

combining, by the personal identification device, the decrypted first section of the biometric encryption key and the decrypted second section of the biometric encryption key to restore the biometric encryption key when the validity of the signature is verified.

17. The system of claim 16, wherein the second section of the biometric encryption key was decrypted by the party using the private key associated with the party.

18. The system of claim 16, wherein the first section of the biometric encryption key was decrypted using a passcode entered by a user.

19. The system of claim 18, wherein the passcode was entered by the user on a second personal identification device.

20. The system of claim 16, the operations further comprising:

decrypting, by a second personal identification device, biometric data associated with the first personal identification device.

21. The system of claim 20, the operations further comprising:

receiving the biometric data associated with the first personal identification device from one of;

the party, an electronic storage repository, or a persistent storage medium.

22. The system of claim 20, the operations further comprising:

storing the biometric data associated with the first personal identification device in the second personal identification device.