Method and apparatus for privacy and authentication in wireless networks

• US RE36,946 E
• Filed: 12/05/1996
• Issued: 11/07/2000
• Est. Priority Date: 11/02/1993
• Status: Expired due to Term

• Current Assignee: Sun Microsystems Incorporated (Oracle Corporation)
• Original Assignee: Sun Microsystems Incorporated (Oracle Corporation)
• Inventors: Diffie, Whitfield, Aziz, Ashar
• Primary Examiner(s): CANGIALOSI, SALVATORE A
• Application Number:
  US08/759,573
• Time in Patent Office: 1,433 Days
• Field of Search: 380/20, 380/21, 380/25, 380/28, 380/30, 380/278, 380/282
• US Class Current: 380/278
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 2209/80 Wireless network architectures or network communication protocols for wireless network security H04W12/00
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/0823 using certificates cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for entity authentication involving certificates H04L9/3263
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/205 involving negotiation or determination of the one or more network security mechanisms to be used, e.g. by negotiation between the client and the server or between peers or by selection according to the capabilities of the entities involved negotiation of communication capabilities H04L69/24
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/0844 with user authentication or key authentication, e.g. ElGamal, MTI, MQV-Menezes-Qu-Vanstone protocol or Diffie-Hellman protocols using implicitly-certified keys
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/0891 Revocation or update of secret information, e.g. encryption key update or rekeying
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/3268 using certificate validation, registration, distribution or revocation, e.g. certificate revocation list [CRL]
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 12/04 Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA]
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 12/06 Authentication

Abstract

A method and apparatus is disclosed for providing a secure wireless communication link between a mobile nomadic device and a base computing unit. A mobile sends a host certificate (Cert_-- Mobile) to the base along with a randomly chosen challenge value (CH1) and a list of supported shared key algorithms ("SKCS"). The base determines if the Cert_-- Mobile is valid. If the Cert_-- Mobile is not valid, then the base unit rejects the connection attempt. The base then sends a Cert_-- Base, random number (RN1) encrypted in mobile'"'"'s public key and an identifier for the chosen SKCS to the mobile. The base saves the RN1 value and adds the CH1 value and the chosen SKCS to messages sent to the base. The mobile unit then validates the Cert_-- Base, and if the certificate is valid, the mobile verifies under the public key of the base (Pub_-- Base) the signature on the message. The signature is verified by taking the base message and appending it to CH1 and the list of shared key algorithms that the mobile provided in the first message. If the base signature is not valid, then the communication attempt is aborted. In the event that the base signature is valid, the mobile determines the value of RN1 by decrypting Pub_-- Mobile, RN1 under the private key of the mobile. The mobile then generates RN2 and the session key, and encrypts RN2 under the Pub_-- Base. The mobile sends the encrypted RN2 and E(Pub_-- Mobile, RN1) to the base. The base then verifies the mobile signature using the Pub_-- Mobile obtained from the Cert_-- Mobile. If the mobile signature is verified, the base decrypts E(Pub_-- Base, RN2) using its private key. The base then determines the session key. The mobile and base may then enter a data transfer phase using encrypted data which is decrypted using the session key which is RN1 ⊕RN2.

Claims