Exploiting Application Characteristics for Multiple-Authenticator Broadcast Authentication Schemes
First Claim
1. A method for securing communications between automotive vehicles in a vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) communications system, the method comprising:
- an on-board computer of a broadcasting vehicle predicting a value for a vehicle parameter;
the on-board computer of the broadcasting vehicle generating a heavyweight authenticating signature to correspond to the predicted value;
the on-board computer of the broadcasting vehicle, subsequent to predicting the value and generating the heavyweight authenticating signature to correspond to the predicted value, obtaining an actual value for the vehicle parameter;
the on-board computer of the broadcasting vehicle comparing the predicted value for the vehicle parameter to the actual value for the vehicle parameter to determine if the predicted value for the vehicle parameter bears a first relationship to the actual value for the vehicle parameter; and
if the on-board computer of the broadcasting vehicle determines in the comparing step that the predicted value bears the first relationship to the actual value;
the on-board computer of the broadcasting vehicle (i) generating a lightweight authenticating signature to correspond to the predicted value and (ii) broadcasting a data message having the predicted value with the corresponding heavyweight authenticating signature and the corresponding lightweight authenticating signature.
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Accused Products
Abstract
A method for securing communications in a vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) system including an on-board computer of a broadcasting vehicle predicting a value for a vehicle parameter, generating a heavyweight signature corresponding to the predicted value, and obtaining an actual value for the vehicle parameter. The method also includes the computer comparing the predicted value to the actual value to determine if the predicted value bears a first relationship to the actual value. If the computer determines that the predicted value bears the relationship to the actual value, the on-board computer generates a lightweight authenticating signature to correspond to the predicted value and broadcasts a data message having the predicted value with the corresponding heavyweight authenticating signature and the corresponding lightweight authenticating signature.
18 Citations
20 Claims
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1. A method for securing communications between automotive vehicles in a vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) communications system, the method comprising:
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an on-board computer of a broadcasting vehicle predicting a value for a vehicle parameter; the on-board computer of the broadcasting vehicle generating a heavyweight authenticating signature to correspond to the predicted value; the on-board computer of the broadcasting vehicle, subsequent to predicting the value and generating the heavyweight authenticating signature to correspond to the predicted value, obtaining an actual value for the vehicle parameter; the on-board computer of the broadcasting vehicle comparing the predicted value for the vehicle parameter to the actual value for the vehicle parameter to determine if the predicted value for the vehicle parameter bears a first relationship to the actual value for the vehicle parameter; and if the on-board computer of the broadcasting vehicle determines in the comparing step that the predicted value bears the first relationship to the actual value; the on-board computer of the broadcasting vehicle (i) generating a lightweight authenticating signature to correspond to the predicted value and (ii) broadcasting a data message having the predicted value with the corresponding heavyweight authenticating signature and the corresponding lightweight authenticating signature. - View Dependent Claims (2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7)
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8. A method for securing communications between automotive vehicles in a vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) communications system according to a prediction-and-multiple-authenticator protocol, the method comprising:
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the on-board computer of the broadcasting vehicle generating a first value for the vehicle parameter; the on-board computer of the broadcasting vehicle preparing a first authenticating signature, having a first security level, to correspond with the first value for the vehicle parameter; the on-board computer of the broadcasting vehicle preparing a predicted, second value for the vehicle parameter having lower accuracy than an accuracy of the first value for the vehicle parameter; the on-board computer of the broadcasting vehicle generating a second security authenticating signature to correspond with the predicted, second value for the vehicle parameter, the second authenticating signature having a lower security level than the security level of the first authenticating signature; the on-board computer of the broadcasting vehicle preparing and broadcasting a data message including the first value, the second, predicted value, and the corresponding authenticating signatures; an on-board computer of a receiving vehicle receiving the data message; the on-board computer of the receiving vehicle determining which level of data accuracy it prefers; the on-board computer of the receiving vehicle processing the authenticating signature corresponding to the preferred level of data accuracy; and then, the on-board computer of the receiving vehicle utilizing the data having the preferred accuracy. - View Dependent Claims (9, 10, 11, 12)
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13. A method for securing communications between automobiles in a vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) communications system according to a delayed-authentication protocol, the method comprising:
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an on-board computer of a broadcasting vehicle determining whether to predict a future value for a vehicle parameter; and if the on-board computer of the broadcasting vehicle determines in the determining step to predict the future value; the on-board computer of the broadcasting vehicle predicting the future value for the vehicle parameter; the on-board computer of the broadcasting vehicle generating, using an authenticating key, an authenticating signature to correspond to the predicted future value; and the on-board computer of the broadcasting vehicle preparing and broadcasting an initial predicted-value message including the predicted value and the corresponding authenticating signature; the on-board computer of the broadcasting vehicle preparing and broadcasting a subsequent predicted-value message including the authenticating key, for use by the receiving vehicles to authenticate the authenticating signature received in the initial predicted-value message for using the predicted value received in the initial predicted-value message. - View Dependent Claims (14, 15)
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16. A method for securing communications between automobiles in a vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) communications system according to a delayed-authentication protocol, the method comprising:
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an on-board computer of a broadcasting vehicle predicting a future value for a vehicle parameter; the on-board computer of the broadcasting vehicle generating a first authenticating signature, using an authenticating key, to correspond to the predicted future value; the on-board computer of the broadcasting vehicle preparing and broadcasting an initial message including the predicted future value and first authenticating signature; the on-board computer of the broadcasting vehicle preparing an actual value of the vehicle parameter; the on-board computer of the broadcasting vehicle generating a second authenticating signature to correspond to the actual value; and the on-board computer of the broadcasting vehicle preparing and broadcasting a subsequent message including the actual value, the second authenticating signature, and the authenticating key used to generate the first authenticating signature, so that receiving vehicles can determine which of the first authenticating signature and the second authenticating signature to process for accessing the predicted value or the actual value, respectively. - View Dependent Claims (17, 18, 19, 20)
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Specification