Method to Detect Tampering of Data

• US 20130254896A1
• Filed: 04/30/2012
• Published: 09/26/2013
• Est. Priority Date: 03/23/2012
• Status: Abandoned Application

• Current Assignee: Infineon Technologies Austria Ag (Infineon Technologies AG)
• Original Assignee: Infineon Technologies Austria Ag (Infineon Technologies AG)
• Inventors: Helmschmidt, Juergen, Parodi, Fabio, Schoenfeldt, Stephan, Rossi, Sergio
• Application Number:
  US13/459,772
• Publication Number:
  US 20130254896A1
• Time in Patent Office: Days
• US Class Current: 726/26
• CPC Class Codes: G01D 4/02 Details
• CPC Class Codes: G01F 15/007 comprising means to prevent fraud
• CPC Class Codes: G01F 15/063 using electrical means
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 21/64 Protecting data integrity, e.g. using checksums, certificates or signatures
• CPC Class Codes: H04Q 2209/60 for transmitting utility meters data, i.e. transmission of data from the reader of the utility meter
• CPC Class Codes: H04Q 9/00 Arrangements in telecontrol or telemetry systems for selectively calling a substation from a main station, in which substation desired apparatus is selected for applying a control signal thereto or for obtaining measured values therefrom
• CPC Class Codes: Y04S 40/20 Information technology specific aspects, e.g. CAD, simulation, modelling, system security

Abstract

A method to detect tampering includes constant acquiring of measurement raw data in a sensor unit; processing of measurement raw data of a defined time interval in a metrology unit, obtaining first measurement results; at least one of storing of the first measurement results and transmitting of the first measurement results to an authority at defined time instances via a communication channel; at least one of storing of a defined fraction of measurement raw data and transmitting of a defined fraction of measurement raw data to the authority in a random manner via the communication channel; processing of the measurement raw data of the defined time interval at the authority, obtaining second measurement results; and comparing the first and second measurement results of a time interval.

Claims

1. A method of detecting tampering of data, the method comprising:

constant acquiring of measurement raw data in a sensor unit;

processing the measurement raw data of a defined time interval in a metrology unit, thereby obtaining first measurement results;

storing and/or transmitting the first measurement results to an authority at defined time instances via a communication channel;

storing and/or transmitting a defined fraction of the measurement raw data to the authority in a random manner via the communication channel;

processing the measurement raw data of the defined time interval at the authority, thereby obtaining second measurement results; and

comparing the first measurement results and second measurement results of a time interval.

2. The method according to claim 1, further comprising packing the measurement raw data to be stored or sent into an array.

3. The method according to claim 2, wherein each array comprises only one sample of each parameter of one measurement point or a subset of each parameter of one measurement point.

4. The method according to claim 2, wherein each array further comprises a code word that marks the array as a raw data array.

5. The method according to claim 2, wherein each array further comprises a randomly chosen internal configuration value of the metrology unit.

6. The method according to claim 5, wherein each array comprises a pointer that points inside the array to assign which randomly chosen internal configuration value is included in the array.

7. The method according to claim 1, wherein the defined fraction of measurement raw data is chosen depending on a random number.

8. The method according to claim 7, wherein the random number is provided by a true random number generator.

9. The method according to claim 1, wherein a deviation between the first and second measurement results of more than a defined maximum threshold is seen as a tampering attack.

10. The method according to claim 1, wherein receiving of more than the defined fraction of measurement raw data at the authority is seen as a tampering attack.

11. The method according to claim 1, wherein the measurement raw data or a random subset of the measurement raw data is stored into an intermediate, not changeable secure memory device and is sent to the authority from this memory.

12. The method according to claim 11, wherein measurement raw data is sent to the authority as not modifiable code or data.

13. The method according to claim 12, wherein measurement raw data is sent to the authority as ROM code.

14. The method according to claim 1, wherein the measurement raw data and the first measurement results are signed in a signature unit before being transmitted to the authority.

15. The method according to claim 14, wherein the signature unit is run in a privileged mode, when raw data is signed.

16. The method according to claim 1, wherein the measurement raw data is stored in a memory unit.

17. The method according to claim 16, wherein the stored measurement raw data can be read out of the memory unit via a serial communication channel.

18. A smart meter comprising:

a sensor unit, configured to measure one or more parameters of interest and provide measurement raw data that represents the parameters of interest; and

a metrology unit, configured to receive the measurement raw data from the sensor unit, to store and/or transmit a defined fraction of measurement raw data of a defined time interval in a random manner via a communication channel, to process the measurement raw data of the defined time interval to obtain first measurement results, and to store and/or transmit the first measurement results via the communication channel;

wherein the smart meter is configured to be coupled to an authority via the communication channel, the authority being configured to receive the first measurement results, receive and process the defined fraction of measurement raw data of the defined time interval thereby obtaining second measurement results, and to compare the first and second measurement results of a time interval.

19. A system to detect tampering of data, the system comprising:

a smart meter, which comprises

a sensor unit, configured to measure one or more parameters of interest and provide measurement raw data, representing the parameters of interest; and

a metrology unit, configured to receive the measurement raw data from the sensor unit, to store and/or transmit a defined fraction of measurement raw data of a defined time interval in a random manner via a communication channel, to process measurement raw data of the defined time interval thereby obtaining first measurement results, and to store and/or transmit the first measurement results via the communication channel; and

an authority coupled to the smart meter via the communication channel, the authority configured to receive and process the defined fraction of measurement raw data of the defined time interval thereby obtaining second measurement results, to receive the first measurement results, and to compare the first and second measurement results of a time interval.

20. The system according to claim 19, wherein the smart meter has a unique identification number to match the smart meter with an account of a customer.

21. The system according to claim 19, wherein the sensor unit is configured to measure parameters of interest of an electricity, water, gas or heating line.

22. The system according to claim 21, wherein the authority is controlled by an electricity, water, gas or heating supplier.

23. The system according to claim 21, wherein the authority is a central authority, independent of an electricity, water, gas or heating supplier.

24. The system according to claim 19, wherein the smart meter comprises a nonvolatile memory area, the nonvolatile memory area being readable only by the authority or after identification.

25. The system according to claim 24, wherein raw data, fractions of raw data or intermediate processing results are stored in the nonvolatile memory area.